The Media Market and Media Ownership in Post-Communist Ukraine

Impact on Media Independence and Pluralism
Natalya Ryabinska M edia markets and media ownership in Central and East European countries are useful indicators of the levels of media freedom and pluralism in the region. strong, developed media markets are essential for the po litical independence of the media. the type of ownership and the strength of the connections between media owners and political actors determine how closely the interests of the people who own private media are intertwined with the concerns of political parties and leaders.
1 the scope and direction of state regulation of media markets are decisive for the state's ability to affect media democratization. an analysis of these factors will help in determining whether governments hinder the democratic performance of media institutions or have tried to facilitate the democratization of the media by implementing policies that ensure the transparency of media ownership, limit ownership con centration, or secure public access to information. 2 Media markets have been the subject of several large, wideranging studies focused on Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic, slovakia, the baltic states, the countries of the former yugoslavia, Romania, and bulgaria, among others. However, such inquiries have never considered the situation of the media market in Ukraine. the transforma tion of the Ukrainian media has, in general, attracted very little attention on the part of scholars. this article attempts to fill the gap by focusing on the issue of media markets and media ownership in postcommunist Ukraine.
Media Markets in Central and Eastern Europe
the changes that took place in the postcommunist coun tries of Central and Eastern Europe were expected to lead to the creation of independent, pluralistic, and democratic media. this process was to begin with the end of the state monopoly over the media and the establishment of pri vate ownership. Privatization was seen as a prerequisite for the independence of the media from state control, because the creation of privately owned media outlets, plural and diverse, would guarantee the fair, representa tive reflection of the whole range of views and interests in Ukrainian society.
However, the formation of a developed and pluralist commercial media sector-free of control or pressure from political or economic interests-has turned out to be a difficult task. although students of postcommunist media transformations acknowledge that some postcom munist countries, especially those currently categorized as "consolidated democracies" (especially the Czech Re public, Poland, and Hungary) managed to establish strong, financially successful, independent commercial outlets and to shape a developed and diverse media market, 3 there is a lingering dissatisfaction with media performance in the region. Commercial media, even if financially inde pendent, are not fully free of political influence coming from both outside and inside. Postcommunist politi cians habitually see the media as "theirs," while many journalists still share the communistera conviction that the population needs to be led, schooled, and mobilized and that journalists should be players in political arena. 4 Political leaders perceive media criticism as a threat and therefore use various formal and, especially, informal instruments to exert pressure on the media. 5 the other obstacle to the democratic performance of privately owned media arises from economic pressurethe dictates of the market. Commercial media have to survive the growing competition in pluralistic media mar kets; at the same time, they seek to maximize their profits, like any other business. the desire of media owners to obtain profits at the lowest possible expense results in the commercialization of the media and the tabloidization of media content. 6 Quality press is replaced by tabloidlike dailies, and tV and radio broadcasters fight for audience attention with the help of cheap entertainment shows and soap operas. as a result, the richness and diversity of media content shrinks: tV formats are standardized and unified (e.g., "Dancing/singing/skating with the stars"), while tV channels offer viewers the same menu of popular soap operas and films. last, but not least, the growing concentration of media ownership poses a significant threat to the pluralism and independence of commercial media. 7 However sharply media analysts in the "settled" new democracies of EastCentral Europe criticize the privately owned, marketdriven media in their countries, these outlets commonly demonstrate a high level of editorial independence and resistance to political pressure. For example, Gazeta Wyborcza and Rzeczpospolita in Poland, Pravo and Mlada Fronta Dnes in the Czech Republic, and Népszabadság in Hungary all show that media in these countries may themselves decide about their content. these countries have completed the transformation of their media institutions to a democratic model and are currently consolidating media freedom as well as shaping the behavioral and attitudinal foundations of media free dom. 8 the hallmark of this stage is the fact that behavioral patterns corresponding to a baseline of media freedom are more and more commonly perceived in these coun tries as something normal and regular, whereas actions that challenge the freedom of the media are increasingly marginalized. 9 this is not the case in Romania, bulgaria, albania, Macedonia, serbia, Montenegro, and other postcom munist countries whose media are still categorized by Freedom House as "partly free." For example, studies of Romanian media show that the values, mentalities, and behavior of media owners, editors, and directors in that country are far removed from media independence and democratic conduct. 10 as Romanian media mogul Dan Voiculescu commented, "the theory of independent me dia is a chimera."
11 Newspapers, radio, and television in Romania, bulgaria, serbia, or albania are, by and large, not autonomous from governments or vested interests, but highly dependent on them, and they function not as democratic institutions, but as tools for trading influ ence and manipulating public opinion in the interests of powerholders. 12 in general, media markets and media ownership in these countries meet several of the follow ing criteria:
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• They are underdeveloped, and therefore cannot easily sever their economic ties with institutions of power.
• They are mostly small and fragmented, and therefore have very limited possibilities to be credible and profitable.
• They are subject to recurrent attempts by the state to control and regulate them.
• Their owners are closely linked to people who wield economic and political power.
• They host a great number of media outlets, particularly broadcast media.
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• They are characterized by a lack of transparency of media ownership.
• They may contain monopolies or a high concentration in press distribution services.
in addition, in some countries (bosnia and Herze govina, Montenegro, Macedonia) the existence of parallel media markets divided along linguistic lines makes the economic survival of commercial media outlets even more complicated. Finally, as in the "settled" new democracies, their media have a negative tendency toward tabloidiza tion, and are undergoing a process of concentration of ownership.
Ukraine began to democratize its media sector in the early 1990s. Censorship was abolished in 1991, and in 1992 the Ukrainian parliament adopted legislation that legalized private ownership of media. While media in Ukraine resemble the media in the "advanced" new de mocracies in some respects (e.g., ownership concentra tion, commercialization, tabloidization), they have much more in common with the media in Romania, bulgaria, and the Western balkan countries. the underdeveloped media markets in these countries are breeding grounds for the use of media in the interest of governments and politicaleconomic elites rather than of the general population.
at the same time, the Ukrainian media system has some peculiarities, such as the unfinished privatization of the media, the continuing existence of stateowned me dia outlets, and the predominance of socalled oligarchs or industrialfinancial magnates in the media industry. Ukrainian private media have to operate amid legal un certainty and disregard for the rule of law, under which even such highprofile crimes against journalists as the murder of Ukrainska Pravda editor Georgiy Gongadze on september 16, 2000, remain unsolved.
14 they also have to compete with media from neighboring Russia, which eas ily penetrate the Ukrainian market with diverse, quality, and-most important-cheap products. this article pres ents the main features of the Ukrainian media market and media ownership in comparison with the situation in other postcommunist countries, pointing to their commonali ties and differences as well as analyzing the impact of the characteristic features of media ownership in Ukraine on the independence and pluralism of the media.
The Ukrainian Media Market
Size and Wealth. With a population of 46 million, Ukraine could have a large, dynamic media market. according to ZenithOptimedia, Ukrainian television has the second largest (after Russia) audience in the region-18.6 million viewers.
15 before the global economic crisis began in the fall of 2008, Ukraine had the fastestgrowing advertising market in Europe, which was expanding at an average of 30 percent per year and was becoming more and more attractive for investors, both domestic and foreign. 16 However, compared to other European countries, the Ukrainian media market is largely underdeveloped. the country's weak economy does not produce enough market resources to ensure the development of a private, advertisementfinanced media sector. the advertising budget in Ukraine is low in comparison with the ad bud gets of countries with populations of comparable size. For example, in 2008 the total tV advertising budget in Ukraine amounted to about $500 million, which was twice as small as the total advertising budget in neighbor ing Poland, and forty times smaller than in Germany.
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Per capita advertising spending in Ukraine is among the lowest in the region-$15.90 in 2006, whereas in Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary it was $100, $173, and $296, respectively, as well as $44.20 in Russia and $57 in bulgaria. 18 since Ukraine is a tVviewing nation, the largest share of advertising money (more than 45 percent) goes to broadcast media. 19 Newspapers, meanwhile, comprise only around 7 percent of the advertising market, which is very small compared to the more common 30-40 percent in neighboring countries, and cannot ensure the newspapers' financial independence. 20 this is one of the reasons for the underdeveloped print media market in Ukraine, where newspaper circulation (74 readers per 1,000 inhabitants) is comparatively low among the post communist countries. 21 as for the tV advertising market, only nationwide channels have a good chance of attracting scarce advertising money, since the advertising budget is very unevenly divided between national and regional tV channels. For example, in 2010 the advertising budget of national tV channels totaled $342 million, whereas regional stations got only $14.7 million in advertising money. 22 advertising income is difficult to get because the ad vertising "pie" has to be divided among too many players. there are fifteen nationwide, nonsatellite broadcast tV channels, one of which (Ut1) is stateowned.
23 this is 2.5 times that in Poland, which has only six national tV broadcasters (two of which are public service broadcast ers).
24 as a result, commercial tV channels in Ukraine wage a fierce battle for ad revenue, often by resorting to the commercialization and tabloidization of their content.
Dependence on Political Advertising. the lack of a de veloped advertising market and the low average income of the Ukrainian population make it difficult for print media to reap profits from sales. in consequence, Ukrai nian media are dependent on political advertising. since 2000, Ukraine has held national elections almost every two years, and political advertising (both direct and indi rect) has become one of the leading sources of advertising money. During the 2009 presidential election campaign, for example, the share of political advertising during the last five months of the year (august-December) accounted for as much as 23.5 percent of all television advertising income in 2009. 25 bearing in mind that this figure is based on data for direct political ads-and thus does not take into account the hidden advertising widely used by presidential contenders-one may assume that political advertising accounts for an even larger share of total tV ad revenue. 26 this is an important difference between Ukraine and other postcommunist countries. For example, spending on political ads in Poland dur ing its parliamentary and presidential elections in 2005 accounted for only about 15 percent of the total tV ad vertising market. 27 in mature democracies, the share of political advertising in media ad revenues is even lower. in the United states, the share of tV political advertising in total television ad revenues oscillates between 2.6 percent and 7.6 percent. 28 in West European democracies like France, the United kingdom, and sweden, paid political advertising is banned or heavily restricted.
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Unfinished Privatization. two factors hinder fair market competition in the Ukrainian media market: unfinished privatization and the continued existence of stateowned and municipal media outlets. Ukraine has not introduced public service broadcasting yet. its media are essentially divided into two sectors: private and stateowned (includ ing municipal and communal media). 30 Ukrainian national and local governments have been in no hurry to privatize the remaining stateowned outlets because they frequently use them for selfpromotion and in power struggles.
the unfinished privatization of the media has inhibited media democratization across postcommunist Central and Eastern Europe. the states where the media partly remains in the hands of national or local authoritiesalbania, Macedonia, Croatia, bosnia and Herzegovina, Moldova, armenia, belarus, Russia, and the Central asian republics-are all states with low scores in the international press freedom rankings.
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When Viktor yushchenko became president in 2005 after the Orange Revolution, he declared that the privati zation of state and municipal media was one of his major goals. However, no significant action followed upon these promising words. in 2006-fifteen years after the start of the postcommunist transformation-as many as half of all newspapers and magazines in Ukraine still belonged to the state. 32 the state also owned thirtyfive television and radio outlets, including the nationwide Ut1 televi sion channel and three radio channels. 33 as of late 2011, the situation has not changed.
in addition, there are still more than 100 stateowned newspapers, as well as more than 800 municipal news papers, awaiting privatization; together they constitute almost 22 percent of all Ukrainian periodicals.
34 the national state owns about 4 percent of the tV and radio sector, on top of the nearly 815 municipal television and radio companies controlled by local governments.
35 these media are used in the interests of local authorities. One of the most well known cases is that of the mayor of kyiv, leonid Chernovetsky, who has, for practical purposes, transformed the capital city's media into his personal public relations firm. 36 During the preterm municipal electoral campaign in 2008, kyiv print and tV outlets heaped lavish praise on Chernovetsky while smearing his rivals' reputations.
37 similar practices are widespread across the county.
although state and municipally owned media are gen erally less popular than privately owned outlets, at least at the national level, 38 many retain a considerable audience share in distant or poorly populated areas where they are the only media available. three stateowned nationwide radio channels have managed to keep a relatively large part of their listeners because of their exclusive access to a system of wire radio broadcasting traditionally popular in Ukraine (especially in rural areas) from soviet times. 39 the same is true for municipal newspapers, which often are the only papers in some rural areas. stateowned media, whether national or local, pose unfair competition against privately owned print media. Unburdened by the need to earn money for their survival, they offer much lower rates to advertisers and lower prices for readers and subscribers, indirectly undermining the financial sustainability of their privately owned rivals. Moreover, state media wage unfair competition on the labor market because the salaries they offer journalists and, more important, their pensions are calculated accord ing to the publicservant scale. thus jobs at stateowned media-especially local print media-are considerably more lucrative than those offered by private media. 40 Unfinished privatization poses yet another obstacle to the development of the media market in Ukraine; namely, the stateowned enterprise Ukrposhta, which dominates the press distribution market. Ukrposhta, a government controlled post office, has a monopoly on press delivery in some regions. thanks to its continued sovietera management system, Ukrposhta is highly inefficient and constantly raises the prices of subscription delivery as well as delivery to retail outlets, thus raising barriers to the development of private publishers, especially in outlying areas. 41 in addition, state authorities have been known to discipline unfavorable media by refusing to deliver publications that have criticized them.
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Foreign Investments. the state is not a good media manager. state and municipal newspapers are boring and continue to practice sovietstyle journalism, while state radio and tV lack new equipment and technologies. the example of other postcommunist countries that have managed to create a developed media market shows that substantial investments are needed to turn oldstyle pub lications into outlets capable of winning audiences and competing in a free market.
the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and the baltic states solved their funding problems by relying on foreign investments. For example, the Polish Rzeczpospolita, an official government daily up to 1989, became a high quality, highcirculation newspaper after the French firm socpresse bought 49 percent of its shares and poured $4.5 million into its renewal. 43 in addition to bankrolling the modernization of out dated communistera media or launching new outlets to help diversify the market, Western businesses bring indus try expertise, professional management, education, and training. students of media and democracy often criticize Western media corporations in Central and Eastern Europe for putting profit ahead of quality, 44 but they acknowledge that foreign owners have extensively contributed to the development of independent pluralist media in the region. For example, Miklos sükösd, of the Center for Media and Communications studies in Central European University (Hungary), believes that foreign ownership effectively ensured that the government would not interfere with Hungary's print media, which were privatized by German and austrian investors. 45 Marius Dragomir, media expert at the Open society institute and editor of the "television across Europe" series, claims that without Western play ers in the media markets of Eastern and Central Europe to keep the debate about media freedom alive and ease the legal environment concerning the media, the situation would have been much more problematic. 46 Western investments in media have been much lower in Ukraine than in Poland, Hungary, or the baltic states. the rare exceptions include glossy magazines and the internet, the only type of media in Ukraine where foreign capital-both Western and Russian-is extensively rep resented. in many Central European countries (Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary, slovakia), Western media companies invest in daily and weekly newspapers, sec tors that are unattractive in Ukraine because of their low profitability. the only popular nationwide news outlet that ever belonged to a Western investor was Korrespondent magazine, whose former main owner, Jed sunden, is a U.s. citizen, but in april 2011 he sold his media holding, kP media, which included Korrespondent, to Ukrainian oligarch Petro Poroshenko. 47 Foreign capital is also pres ent in the Ukrainian tV market, but it is Russians, not "Westerners," who invest in Ukrainian tV channels.
48 in general, however, Ukrainian television, which has become increasingly profitable since the early 2000s, is dominated by Ukrainian businessmen.
to be precise, Western companies did make substantial investments in Ukrainian tV in the late 1990s and early 2000s, but they gradually began to leave the market, sell ing their shares to Ukrainian entrepreneurs. For example, the U.s. company story First Communications was one of the cofounders of iCtV (international Commercial television), a national tV channel, but in 2000 it sold the channel to the Ukrainian tycoon Viktor Pinchuk, the soninlaw of thenpresident leonid kuchma. similarly, the U.s. company Central European Media Enterprises (CME), which cofounded 1+1, one of the most popular Ukrainian tV channels, in 1996 and became its 100 per cent owner in 2008, sold the channel in early 2010 to the Ukrainian oligarch ihor kolomoysky.
Western investors stay away from the Ukrainian media market because of the lack of stable, transparent business regulation, the widespread corruption, and the uneasy relationships between the media and politicians. For example, the abovementioned Jed sunden, the former coowner of the kP media holding and founder of the leading Englishlanguage weekly Kyiv Post, was detained at boryspil airport in early 2000 and declared persona non grata. He was allowed to enter Ukraine only after diplomatic intervention from Washington. 49 an additional barrier to foreign investors, especially in television, is that the main players in the broadcasting sector are not primarily driven by market logic. this dis torts market competition. the owners of Ukrainian tV channels are entrepreneurs, but media outlets are not an important source of capital for them. they see tV as a medium in which they can accumulate political influence and "convert" it into opportunities to develop or support their main businesses. they invest generously in their media holdings and fight for the high ratings that deter mine how much influence a channel has, but obtaining an (immediate) profit is not necessarily what motivates them. For example, Rinat akmetov's "Ukraine" tV channel, which has undergone basic and expensive reorganization since 2005, has never turned a profit. 50 this does not mean that Ukrainian media owners, espe cially media moguls, do not seek profits. On the contrary, with the development of the media market, they increas ingly view their media companies as profitable businesses. Nonetheless, they do not hesitate to pay overpriced sums for broadcasting licenses, invest in disproportionately ex pensive equipment, or take other steps that seem illogical from the point of view of normal market behavior. this is because political goals take precedence over profits.
"External" Media Ownership. the most popular media in Ukraine, especially at the national level, are privately owned. the top five Ukrainian tV channels are all com mercial enterprises, whereas the stateowned Ut1 ranks seventh, with an audience share of only 3.39 percent (see Table 1 ).
51 the top nationwide dailies, Fakty i kommentarii, Argumenty i fakty, Segodnya, and Komsomolskaya pravda v Ukraine, are also privately owned (see Table 2 ). 52 What distinguishes the Ukrainian market from the media markets in many other postcommunist countries of Central and Eastern Europe is the fact that the most prominent media owners in Ukraine are industrial and financial magnates with good political connections. their main interests are outside the media sector. three of the four media empires controlling the tV market in Ukraine belong, respectively, to Viktor Pinchuk, the founder and main owner of one of Ukraine's leading steel industry groups; Rinat akhmetov, a coal and steel magnate and the country's richest man; 53 and igor kolomoysky, the leading partner of a banking and industrial conglomer ate engaged in the steel, chemical, and energy industries. they need access to media to influence politics and protect their businesses, given Ukraine's weak state, unreliable institutions, and lack of rule of law. Political influence also may lead to commercial privileges and advantages as state property continues to be privatized. 54 in her study of contemporary Russian media, koltsova distinguishes two types of ownership: "internal" and "external." internal media owners confine their activities to media organizations and are guided mainly by their interest in earning a profit from their media business. External owners, in contrast, are "interested first of all in their political capital or in the development of other kinds of business for which they need the advertising propaganda resource of the mass media." 55 External ownership of media outlets constrains the independence and pluralism of the media because of the political and economic interests of their owners. koltsova notes that internal media owners, whose primary aim is profit maximization, predominantly control the financial aspects of their media business and never interfere in the area of content. this is not the case for external owners, for whom the media is a tool with which to realize their political and economic goals. they can overlook some financial mismanagement, but steadfastly exercise control over content. 56 External media ownership is not common in the "settled" new democracies of Eastern and Central Europe. Media outlets in these countries are owned mostly by national and foreign companies for which media is the main business. the cases of entry of external capital into domestic media markets are a cause of concern among analysts. 57 Postcommunist countries with weak media markets (Macedonia, albania, bulgaria, Romania) tend to be dominated by external owners. the media in all these countries suffer from the interplay of economic, political, and media power concentrated in the hands of the same owners. in some cases, the owners of media conglomer ates specialize in the media business. in Romania, for example, the media landscape is a mix of outlets that are profitoriented and outlets for which profits are incidental to protecting and promoting the economic and political interests of their owners. 58 However, in all the post communist countries external ownership of media outlets hampers the democratic performance of the media.
ironically enough, although private ownership is con sidered an important condition for the independence of the media, 59 the process of media appropriation by large financialindustrial groups in Ukraine was accompanied by a reduction of their autonomy and freedom.
60 Ukrainian "big fish" began to seize portions of the media market in the mid1990s. by 1995, interest groups that had both administrative decisionmaking power and economic resources began to emerge. their economic power was consolidated through the largescale privatization process conducted by President kuchma. Ukrainian oligarchic clans also gradually gained ownership or control in the media sector. 61 this trend intensified after 1998, when a global finan cial crisis significantly weakened private media compa nies. their establishment was possible after the adoption of laws in 1990-1991 abolishing the Communist Party's monopoly on the media and allowing private ownership of media organizations. if before 1998 many broadcasting companies functioned as conventional, middlesized busi ness structures and were relatively free and independent, the crisis-combined with growing political pressure by the kuchma administration-forced them to sell their shares to politically and economically powerful oligarchic clans. Within a year or two, the main nationwide Ukrai nian tV channels (inter, 1+1, iCtV, tEt) fell under the control of industrial magnates. Most of these figures were members of the entourage of President kuchma-his soninlaw, steelpipe tycoon Viktor Pinchuk; leaders of the propresidential socialDemocratic Party of Ukraine (United); energy barons Viktor Medvedchuk and the syrkis brothers; and members of the wealthy donetski clan of Donbas magnates, which includes akhmetov. this process triggered a constant reduction of media independence, which in 2002 resulted in the introduction of censorship by means of temnyky, unofficial instructions issued by the kuchma administration to the main media outlets "recommending" what events to cover and how.
thus, oligarchs bought media outlets in the late 1990s, but not necessarily as financial investments. instead, they did so as a means of accumulating political capital and enhancing their personal prestige. aleksander bohutskyi, general director of iCtV, noted that in the 1990s owning a tV channel or at least a radio station was a status symbol for Ukrainian businessmen. 62 Mediapolitical relations changed after the Orange Revolution in 2004-5, which brought Viktor yushchenko to the presidency instead of kuchma's designated succes sor, Viktor yanukovych. yushchenko canceled the practice of issuing temnyky and other forms of presidential control over the content of the media. the Orange Revolution elevated a new group of political elites; many of the oli garchs who had supported kuchma had to withdraw-at least temporarily-from prominent roles in parliament, the government, or the state administration. Oligarchs who owned influential media shifted their focus to the profitmaking component of their media portfolios. by the early 2000s, their television companies reached a breakeven point, if not turning a small profit. From this moment onward, it is fair to use the term "marketization" to describe the Ukrainian tV business. by the early 2000s, Ukrainian tV channels had begun to compete for revenue and operate as conventional busi nesses. the weakening of state control over the media and the growing marketization (at least in the field of broadcasting) did not, however, lead to their independence from political and economic interests.
On the one hand, after the Orange Revolution newspa pers and tV channels allowed far more criticism of the government and leading politicians than in the kuchma era. On the other hand, the Ukrainian media's dependence on politics (and economic interests) did not go away in 2005; it merely changed in form. if, during kuchma's presidency, the media published materials propagating the policies of the president and the government and remained silent about their misconduct because they were forced to, under yushchenko they began to praise political leaders or criticize their rivals for pay.
in the search for profits, the owners of the Ukrainian media did their best to attract any type of advertising. starting in 2006-7, jeansa (hidden advertising) became a very common sight in Ukrainian newspapers and on tV channels. incessant and fierce rivalries for political power between oligarchic clans conditioned the popularity of political jeansa, especially before elections.
During 64 Media experts reported that before the elections the media set fixed prices not only for official political advertising, but also for materi als produced to order. 65 before the 2006 parliamentary elections, for instance, the price for hidden political ad vertising on a national tV channel was 2,500 hryvnias (about $495) per minute, whereas a twentyminute talk show on a lowrated tV channel cost 30,000 hryvnias (about $5,940). 66 One could contact an editorial office and order not only a "promotional story" about a candidate or a "discrediting story" about the candidate's rivals, but also something more significant. according to media expert Otar Dovzhenko, one toprated national tV channel of fered a "loyalty package" guaranteeing positive coverage of a candidate, regular appearances of the candidate on the air, blockage of critical materials launched by the candidate's rivals, and even the maximum reduction of materials about other candidates; this package could be purchased in 2006 for around $2-3 million. 67 Ukrainian media experts have described the period of jeansa dominance from 2005 to 2010 as a time when "censorship by the authorities" was replaced with "censor ship by money." after the Orange Revolution, against all expectations, the media did not become public watchdogs or platforms for debate on issues of public interest, but instead were merely mouthpieces for big business and politics.
Moreover, while the oligarchs adopted a more com mercial approach to programming, they continued to use the media for their own political schemes. the bestknown example is the "war" that inter tV waged against thenprime minister yulia tymoshenko in 2009 as part of a conflict around the gas supply business between one of the channel's owners and the prime minister's political group, the socalled bloc of yulia tymoshenko. 68 the "Orange period" of relative press freedom ended in February 2010 when Viktor yanukovych won the presi dency. the new president's team implemented a return to centralized control over the media, as practiced under kuchma. However, their policy is more sophisticated in that it takes into account the mistakes made by kuchma's advisers. For example, whereas the kuchma adminis tration distributed its temnyky by fax or email (which facilitated disclosure by the media community), today's government instructions are communicated to the media by telephone or in private to avoid leaving a paper trail. However, the changed character of tV news programs, which have become uniformly uncritical of the president and the ruling coalition, indicates that the content of pri vate media is again being orchestrated from above.
Reports by media monitoring and research organi zations confirm that today's information programs in Ukraine are much like those in kuchma's (and even in soviet) times: they are full of government propaganda and manipulations, and the performance of powerholders is either covered positively or (in the case of unpopular decisions) not mentioned. 69 this shift in political cover age, affecting both state and private media, occurred immediately after President yanukovych came to office. Reporters at private tV channels reacted to the pressure exerted on their editorial offices by issuing public state ments on censorship and taking other organized actions. However, the industrial magnates who own the channels did not protest the infringement of their media indepen dence. as long as their main business interests (which lie outside the media sector) are not troubled, they readily adjust the editorial policies of their channels to the de mands of current political leaders.
External ownership of media, the predominant form in Ukraine, significantly hampers the independence and pluralism of the media. the media owned by oligarchs serve at best as a mouthpiece for business oligarchs and political groups and have little in common with the democratic functions of a free press. the changes that have taken place in Ukrainian media since yanukovych's victory in the 2010 presidential elections suggest that hav ing the media concentrated in the hands of a few external owners considerably helped the yanukovych team to curb the relative independence of the media.
Russia experienced a similar reverse development in the early 2000s that established centralized state control over the most significant media, further suggesting that external media ownership may facilitate the process of reversing the democratization of the media in postcom munist countries. in the 1990s, Russia owed the relative pluralism and independence of its media to their owner ship by several oligarchs whose interests did not always coincide with the interests of the kremlin and who used their media outlets to criticize the government and further their economic and political goals. in the early years of his presidency, Vladimir Putin methodically attacked the media empires owned by his critics and redistributed their holdings among statecontrolled businesses or oligarchs loyal to the kremlin. 70 For example, Gazprom, a state controlled gas monopoly, acquired the popular nationwide NtV channel owned by Vladimir Gusinsky, whereas ORt, the tV channel with the widest reception area in Russia, passed from kremlin critic boris berezovsky to kremlinconnected Roman abramovich. 71 these high profile cases cowed other independent media, which began to selfcensor content and avoid challenging the regime, practices now widespread among journalists in Russia. today's Russian media are obedient servants of the regime, manipulating public opinion in the interests of the kremlin.
another pernicious effect of external ownership is corruption, especially among journalism professionals. Journalists employed by external media owners become accustomed to pleasing their masters rather than meet ing the public need for information or striving to act in the public interest. studies of the culture of journalism in Russia, where external media ownership is common, show that journalists there perceive their profession as "a type of PR, working for the interests of influential groups and persons in politics and business." 72 Pulled into the clientelist orbits of their patrons, they serve particularist interests and not the interests of society at large. 73 they "consider venality and professionalism to be of the same order" and judge fellow journalists not on the basis of ethics but by their ability to earn money. 74 Professional attitudes of this kind impede the democratic transforma tion of the media but seem quite compatible with a reverse movement toward centralized control of the media.
karol Jakubowicz describes the appropriation of the media market by oligarchic groups in some post communist Central and Eastern European countries as a "remonopolization." in his view, abolition of state media monopolies (demonopolization), media differentiation, democratization, and professionalization of journalists constitute the minimum of what would ensure qualitative change in Central and Eastern European media as com pared to the situation under communist rule. 75 in some countries, such as Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, slovenia, and Estonia, the process of demonopolization was relatively successful and resulted in the creation of a developed media market with diverse, privately owned outlets independent both financially and generally.
76 in many of the former soviet republics, the media were in fact "remonopolized" by media groups headed by oli garchs closely associated with-or part of-the political elite. instead of gaining independence, the media became dependent on politicaleconomic elites that use the media for personal political and economic purposes.
Concentration of Ownership.
Ukrainian media share with the media in other Central and East European countries a tendency toward concentration of media ownership. the major owners on the Ukrainian media market own media "empires" that encompass tV and radio, newspapers, and other kinds of outlets. Rinat akhmetov owns the high rating national tV channel "Ukraine," the national daily Segodnya, the internet portal segodnya, a printing house in Vyshgorod, and a number of local media outlets in the Donbas. Viktor Pinchuk is the owner of four national tV channels-iCtV, stb, Novy, and the M1 music chan nel, the largestcirculation daily Fakty i kommentarii the publishing house Ekonomika (newspaper Delo, and magazines Investgazeta and Marketing Media Review), and other media. ihor kolomoysky owns the national 1+1, tEt, and kino tV channels, several newspapers and magazines, is a coowner of the UNiaN news agency, and in 2010 extended his media empire to the media holding Glavred, which includes several internet sites and news outlets.
77 the broadcasting sector of the Ukrainian media is divided between four financialpolitical groups: the interMediaGroup group, led by khoroshkovsky, cur rently the head of the security service of Ukraine, 78 and the groups owned respectively by akhmetov, Pinchuk, and kolomoysky.
the high concentration of the Ukrainian media mar ket means that several large media corporations receive the lion's share of the advertising "pie." For example, in 2009 the advertising revenue of the national tV channels totaled 2.1 million hryvnias, whereas khoroshkovsky's interMediaGroup (tV channels inter, NtN, k1, k2, and Megasport) and Pinchuk's starlightMedia, accrued almost 1.6 million hryvnias. this means that just two media players in the Ukrainian tV market obtained 75 percent of the total advertising revenue. 79 the media market in Ukraine is subject to antitrust legislation, but in practice media monopolies are not regulated. the government's antitrust agency is unable to effectively combat the monopolization of the media market. 80 Ukrainian media moguls conceal their owner ship of the media with the help of offshore entities and figureheads. at the same time, there is no legal provision for more transparent media ownership, and attempts to draft such a law have, to date, not proved successful. as a result, the process of media concentration does not come up against any significant government barriers.
Media concentration is harmful for at least for two reasons. First, it hampers the diversification of program ming. in Ukraine, where the main tV channels are owned by four large corporations, airtime is filled with the same kinds of product-cheap Russian soap operas, american shows, Russian comedies and gala concerts, and national talent shows. second, it endangers political pluralism. this becomes obvious in situations when the political interests of the media owners coincide, at least temporarily. Under yushchenko's presidency, the first alarming case of this kind took place during the kyiv mayoral elections in 2008.
leonid Chernovetsky, who was seeking another term as mayor, was for various reasons a convenient candidate for the owners of all the main tV channels. No wonder, then, that the channels waged a campaign on his behalf. special "capital city" segments added to the major news programs did little more than advertise Chernovetsky's campaign. at the same time, news programs almost never mentioned the candidates running against him. there was also no critical coverage of Chernovetsky's performance in office, although his personality and his policies as mayor gave plenty of opportunity for such a critique (dur ing his first term in office, for example, Chernovetsky was twice denounced as "Press Enemy No. 1"). the editorial offices of the major national tV channels claim that they received strict orders "from above" (i.e., from their top managers or owners) to not criticize Chernovetsky. they were told that this order "was the decision of sharehold ers." 81 No journalists attempted to disobey it. the situa tion led Viktoria syumar, director of the institute of Mass information, to concede: "it was we, the journalists who got Chernovetsky reelected." 82 the kyiv mayoral elections serve as proof that, even when state pressure is reduced, concentrated ownership may have grave consequences for independent, plural media. the whole history of media oligopoly in Ukraine, enriched recently by the evident strengthening of central ized control of the media under President yanukovych, argues in favor of the thesis that the concentration of media ownership in the weak democracies of postsoviet countries is an important obstacle to the democratization of the media.
The Russian Factor. last but not least, the strong com petition coming from Russian newspapers, radio, and tV channels weakens the Ukrainian media market and hampers its development. the Ukrainian versions of the Russian newspapers Komsomolskaya pravda, Izvestia, and Argumenty i fakty are very popular;
83 Argumenty i fakty is the second most circulated newspaper in the country (see table 2 ). Russian tV channels are also popular. they are available in Ukraine via cable and satellite, and in some areas via terrestrial television (in U.s. usage, broadcast television). this is especially true for the eastern territories of Ukraine bordering with Russia and populated mostly by Russianspeaking inhabitants, as well as the south of Ukraine, also populated by Russianspeakers. in the Crimea, more than half the population gets its news from Russian tV channels.
84
Products of the Russian media industry get to Ukrainian audiences not only via Russian tV channels. Ukrainian tV schedules are heavily padded with Russian serials, reality shows, and gala concerts. Russian soap operas and comedy shows are constantly among the most popular programs in the Ukrainian tV ratings. 85 in comparison with the somewhat parochial domestic media product, the Russian tV industry offers programs of higher quality and variety. Ukrainian tV channels willingly purchase Russian programs and serials, first, because viewers like them, and second, because they are cheap. since they usu ally come to Ukraine after having recouped their costs in the huge Russian market, their prices are much lower than the prices of Ukrainian product. this unequal competition undermines Ukraine's own media producers. 86 the presence of a stronger media market in the neigh borhood that intrudes on a country's information space is typical of several other postcommunist countries. it can be found, first, in the balkan region, where the media of Macedonia, Montenegro, and bosniaHerzegovina face strong competition from serbian and, sometimes,
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Croatian newspapers, tV, and radio, and, second, in some former soviet countries (Moldova, latvia, lithuania, Estonia), which experience the "intrusion" of Russian media into their markets. in all these cases, the neighbor ing media entering the country's market are supported by a larger audience and a correspondingly larger advertising market, and thus compete with national producers under nonequal conditions.
What is special in this respect about Ukraine in com parison with other countries is the extraordinarily large scale of the neighbor's presence in its media market. For example, whereas in lithuania in 2007 the share of Rus sian programs, tV series, movies, and talk shows in the broadcasting time of major tV networks ranged from 1 percent to 31 percent, 87 in Ukraine it was and continues to be much higher. according to the state Committee of television and Radio broadcasting of Ukraine, up to 80 percent of the broadcast time of Ukrainian radio and tV channels is filled with nonUkrainian product.
88 the lion's share is Russian product. Even more dramatic is the picture of the book market in Ukraine. according to market research ordered by the Renaissance Founda tion in 2007 as well as assessments by experts from the Ukrainian Publishers and booksellers association, about 85 percent of the books sold in Ukraine are produced in Russia.
89
State Mechanisms to Pressure the Media Market and Commercial Media
No analysis of the Ukrainian media market would be complete without some discussion of the role of the state. although statemedia relations in Ukraine are unstable and largely depend on oligarchs who exercise influence in this area by taking part in parliamentary lawmaking or by ap pointing their allies to the state bodies that oversee the media, it is worth examining the tools for regulation of the media market that the Ukrainian state has at its disposal.
like several other postcommunist countries, the Ukrainian state plays a constraining rather than enabling role in the development of the media market and the enhancement of independent, privately owned media. Ukraine's foremost politicians formed their views on the relations between media and politics during the soviet epoch; they demonstrate little knowledge of or interest in the essence of freedom of speech and prefer to treat the media as servants of the political interests of power holders. Moreover, the state does not simply hamper the privatization of state and municipally owned media, leaving them at the disposal of national or local govern ments, but it also applies different mechanisms to control the commercial sector of the media.
Selectively Enforced Laws.
One such mechanism is me dia legislation. as exploited by those who hold power, laws pertaining to the media are often transformed into a tool for disciplining disobedient media. according to the Report of the Moscow Media law and Policy institute (2007), Ukrainian media legislation is the second most developed, from the standpoint of legal guarantees of mass media freedom, among the countries of the former soviet Union, including the baltic states. However, the authorities employ legal drawbacks and loopholes to im pede media independence and democratic performance. For example, in summer 2009 the Ukrainian parliament amended the national criminal code to add the posses sion of pornography to the master list of crimes. the amendment made it a criminal offense to electronically or physically store literature, images, or other objects of "a pornographic nature" intended for sale or distribution, but does not clearly define what constitutes "a pornographic nature." Human rights activists and lawyers in Ukraine fear that the law will be misused by the police to blackmail individual citizens and editorial offices. the next shortcoming of Ukraine's media legislation is that some of it is vague or contradictory, which opens up the possibility for arbitrary decisions by judges and regu latory bodies. For example, the National tV and Radio broadcasting Council (NtRbC) often uses the language quota regulations to punish broadcasters. these regula tions limit the amount of broadcasting in languages other than Ukrainian, but they are inconsistent. For example, article 10 of the law governing the use of languages in tV and radio broadcasts treats the Ukrainian quota dif ferently in two separate paragraphs. Whereas Paragraph 3 requires that every nonUkrainian film or program be dubbed in Ukrainian, Paragraph 4 establishes a 75 percent quota on Ukrainian language programming for national broadcasters, which means that it is acceptable that some nonUkrainian programs (as much as 25 percent of total broadcasting time) are not dubbed. 90 the inconsistency of these regulations gives the NtRbC an opportunity to enforce the law selectively.
What is more, the media legislation is frequently changed, which causes additional problems for me dia organizations and makes them vulnerable to state pressure. according to the konrad adenauer stiftung Democracy Report for 2008, Ukraine's media law was modified and supplemented as many as ten times dur ing the preceding five years. 91 in 2008, for example, the NtRbC introduced new provisions on production and language quotas in broadcasting. 92 these raised the quota of Ukrainianlanguage broadcasting from 75 percent to 80 percent. Editorial offices were troubled, because it was difficult to follow the new requirements on startup: broadcasters calculated that to meet the new NtRbC demands, they had to spend an additional $200 million to translate foreignlanguage programs (mostly Russian) into Ukrainian. 93 However, the language quota change in license provi sions and the subsequent NtRbC monitoring of national tV channels did not mean that every channel with a broad cast schedule that did not satisfy the 80 percent Ukrainian language rule was deprived of its license. Channels 1+1, NtN, Ukraine, and Novy, according to the NtRbC moni toring, did not fulfill the Ukrainianlanguage requirements, but they were not punished at all. the sanctions (or, to be more precise, a warning on sanctions) were received only by the inter channel, which was not loyal to thenpresident Victor yushchenko. as the president had de facto control of the NtRbC up to mid2009, he was able to use amend ments to discipline broadcasters.
Regulatory and Monitoring Bodies. the institutions that regulate and monitor the media are another tool employed by the state to control the media market. Marius Dragomir, in his study of media reforms in postcommunist Europe, 94 shows that postcommunist governments employ two main strategies to exert influence upon media via insti tutions: they either adapt existing broadcasting councils whose real task is to regulate the activities of tV and radio in the name of the public good, or they establish new monitoring institutions similar to the censorship committees of the communist era.
For Ukrainian politicians, the broadcasting council is an important means of controlling and regulating the media market. the National television and Radio broad casting Council was created in 1994 as a public regulatory body, with a remit to supervise broadcasters and grant licenses. However, from its early days, the NtRbC was accused of manipulating the procedures for awarding and canceling tV and radio licenses to further the political and economic interests of its members or the political groups backing them. this was claimed, for example, in thirty lawsuits filed by journalists in 2002. 95 in the first years of yanukovych's presidency, the NtRbC repeat edly proved to be an instrument of political control over broadcasting. For example, in June 2010 it forwarded a court decision to withdraw frequencies awarded to the oppositionoriented channel tbi on the eve of the presi dential elections. 96 later, in June 2011 it refused to award a license for satellite broadcasting to tV channel info24, founded by managers and journalists of tbi.
at the time of writing this article, the licensing of broadcast media is a very nontransparent and shadowy process, just as it was in the late 1990s and early 2000s. according to many broadcasting managers and editors, the NtRbC has become the "traffic cop" of Ukraine's television and radio space, 97 a disparaging nickname given the poor reputation of its bribeseeking namesakes in the Ukrainian state automotive inspection. since the licensing regulations are unclear and ambiguous, it is hard to know what conditions must be met in order to get a license and exactly what actions are in violation of the licensing requirements. besides, the NtRbC itself very often either fails to punish license violations or penalizes only arbitrarily selected violators.
this leads to a situation where practically every broad casting company bends the regulations to some degree. Consequently, the regulatory power of the NtRbC is a convenient tool for the punishment of dissenting broad casters. as Telekytyka magazine characterized the state of affairs, "as far as every channel is violating the law or its license to a certain extent, the NtRbC may be a univer sal tool of influence on television businesses like the tax administration or fire inspectors," government agencies traditionally used to harass businesses. 98 as mentioned previously, some postcommunist states also influence the media through new monitoring entities created officially for some respectable purpose, such as the protection of state secrets, but in fact fulfilling the functions of censorship bodies. 99 the recent history of postcommunist countries brings several examples of such institutions: the inspection agency of state secrets in Uzbekistan, which reviews and approves the publica tion of news stories; the turkmen state Committee for the Protection of state secrets, which de facto screens critical and opposition views in the media; the state inspectorate to Protect the Freedom of the Press and Mass information at the Russian Ministry of Press and Mass information, which functions as a censorship body. 100 in Ukraine, this tendency is exemplified by an institution named the National Expert Commission for Public Moral Protec tion (NEC), which is progressively becoming a powerful means to execute governmental control over media.
the NEC was created by the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine in November 2004 shortly before yushchenko was elected president. its declared aim was "to ensure the realization of state policies in the sphere of the protection of public morals." 101 the Cabinet of Ministers appoints the head of the NEC 102 and approves the composition of its membership. the duties of the NEC include supervi sion of adherence to the law on the Protection of Public Morals, monitoring of tV, radio, video, and other infor mation products with regard to their compliance with the regulations on protection of public morals, and prevention of the distribution of materials containing scenes of vio lence and pornography. 103 the law on the Protection of Public Morals, among other things, bans the production and distribution of materials propagating war and hatred on religious or national grounds, fascism and neofascism, and harmful habits such as alcoholism, addiction to drugs or toxic substances, and smoking.
the NEC was initially conceived as an expert agency whose main function was to analyze media products based on morality guidelines, but since 2008 it has become an influential mediacontrolling body. For example, it ef fectively prohibited further airing of The Simpsons by issuing a verdict that the cartoon series might provoke juvenile delinquency. based on its evaluation, the National television and Radio broadcasting Council warned tV channels not to air The Simpsons under penalty of a fine or even license withdrawal. NEC complaints similarly led to the cancellation of several comedy programs and serials, including a Russian adaptation of the american sitcom Married . . . with Children. it also prohibited the screen ing of sacha baron Cohen's film Bruno and seized copies of the Ukrainian novel The Woman of His Dreams by the winner of the shevchenko Prize, Oles Ulianenko.
What appears to be even more significant about the NEC is that its full potential has not been realized, but could be activated under the prevailing circumstances. the NEC is not independent, but is subordinate to the government and hence can be directly used for political purposes. the legislation that regulates it, the law on the Protection of Public Morals, contains a number of vague clauses concerning freedom of expression and information distribution.
104 some of them run counter to article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights. 105 according to Professor Dirk Voorhoof of Ghent University, who carried out an expert analysis of the law for the Council of Europe in 2004, this legislation is unclear and ambiguous and has a very wide purview of application. Consequently, the NEC has the potential to become a true weapon against independent media.
Disregard for the Rule of Law and Failure to Protect Media Independence
a specific feature of the Ukrainian media market and the environment in which it exists is a profound disregard for the rule of law. as a result, although Ukrainian media law is considered to be rather liberal and well developed, it does not ensure the independence of commercial media and protect them from political pressure. 106 Ukrainian legislation contains such advanced elements as a law on access to public information, legal provisions on editorial independence, and civil (not criminal) responsibility for defamation, but the democratizing effect of these laws is hampered by serious enforcement problems. Ukraine's media laws and regulations are routinely violated by state officials, by media regulatory bodies, and by private media enterprises and their owners.
the government itself displays a disregard for the law. For example, in 1999 President kuchma refused to ap point his four members of the NtRbC because he disliked the members appointed by the parliament. the NtRbC, in consequence, was unable to function for more than a year-until the parliament gave in and appointed four other people, after which the president finally appointed his quota of members. 107 Equally dramatic is the situation regarding parliament's adherence to the law. as a case in point, in 2008-9 the term of office of two members of the NtRbC expired.
108 they had both been appointed under the parliamentary quota, and parliament was required by law to appoint replacements within two months.
109 but as parliament never appointed the new members, the "old" ones continued to serve until the beginning of 2010, rendering as questionable the legality of NtRbC actions taken during that period.
the decisions of the NtRbC are often in conflict with the law. Not only does it award and renew licenses to companies that violate licensing agreements, but it also tolerates the operations of unlicensed broadcasting companies. in 2008, the NtRbC turned a blind eye to a gross violation of the licensing regulations-the so called exchange of logos between Megasport, a national terrestrial sports channel, and k1, which broadcasts only in thirteen cities (plus cable broadcasting). the license holders of these channels, in fact, exchanged not only logos, but also frequencies and licenses. the Megasport channel, licensed to broadcast for a national audience, switched to a narrower broadcast signal, giving its place to k1. the NtRbC took no action against, once more demonstrating that it is governed not by the law but by other considerations.
Media companies in Ukraine also often break the law. the most widespread infringements by private broadcast ers include breaches of license agreements, exceeding advertising limits, and violation of language quotas. an other common practice of media owners and management is paying salaries "in envelopes," a violation of the labor regulations.
110 this is especially harmful for the indepen dence of editorial personnel and individual journalists. When the size of a journalist's salary is not a matter of public knowledge, the manager is free to pay less.
Disregard for the law has a very negative impact on the independence of the media. the law serves not so much to protect journalists and freedom of speech as to punish disobedient media. Media and journalists have little chance to defend their rights in courts. While there has been somewhat less violence against journalists since the great public outcry about Georgiy Gongadze's murder and especially since the Orange Revolution, harassment and intimidation are still not rare, and these crimes are not properly investigated. 111 the most striking example is the lack of progress in the investigation of the Gongadze murder, but there are also a number of instances where the perpetrators of other crimes against journalists have not been convicted or sent to prison. according to Vik tor Danylov, the director of the OGO Publishing House, "Crimes against journalists gain broad resonance in the media, but actually there are no completed investigations and prosecution of the guilty."
112 the impunity of those who assault journalists has led to a state of permanent tension and fear among media professionals, making them resort to selfcensorship.
karol Jakubowicz considers inadequate separation of powers and disregard for the law to be the two most characteristic features of the socalled type b countries (mainly former republics of the soviet Union: Moldova, Ukraine, Russia, etc.), as opposed to the type a countries, namely, the "established" new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, slovenia, Estonia).
113 in type a countries, "media wars" are conducted within the bounds of law, while in type b countries, they are carried out irrespective of existing laws and institutions. 114 this partly explains the different pace of media democratization in the countries of these two groups. Jakubowicz claims that effective rule of law is an indispensable condition for the establishment of media independence and autonomy. it is vital that the legal framework designed to protect media autonomy be respected by the media, political circles, and the state ap paratus. 115 Unfortunately, the current situation in Ukraine falls short of this demand.
Conclusion
the preceding discussion has analyzed the media market and media ownership in Ukraine from the standpoint of their impact on media independence and pluralism. it indicates some commonalities and differences between the Ukrainian media market and the media in other post communist Central and East European countries.
the analysis showed that the Ukrainian media system, like the media in Europe (and the rest of the world), are undergoing the processes of commercialization, tab loidization, and concentration of media ownership. What is specific to Ukraine, however, is that the concentration of market ownership is predominantly conditioned by political and not just commercial interests.
the comparison of the Ukrainian media market with the markets in Central and Eastern Europe showed that Ukrainian commercial media have much more in com mon with the media of south European postcommunist countries (albania, bulgaria, Macedonia, Montenegro, Romania, serbia) than with the media in Poland, Hungary, or the Czech Republic. Compared to the "advanced" new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe, Ukraine has not managed to create a large and developed media market, where the high profits of media enterprises can ensure their independence from political interests. like the countries of southern Europe and some postsoviet countries (excluding the baltic states), Ukraine has an underdeveloped media market with a low advertising budget. as a result, most of its private media are unable to cut the links that make them economically dependent on political interests. as is also the case in the countries mentioned above, the Ukrainian market hosts too many media, further impairing both their profitability and their autonomy. the market "overpopulation" in all of these countries has essentially the same cause-media owners set up or maintain media businesses not in quest of finan cial success but to exercise political influence.
What is specific to Ukraine, however, is the pre dominance of oligarchs as owners of its media. these industrialfinancial magnates are "external" to the media industry, because their main business interests are not in the media but in steel, coal, energy, banking, and other spheres. they see media ownership as a means to further their economic interests, which depend extensively on political decisions. they use the media to gain political weight in order to influence these decisions. Oligarchic ownership of Ukraine's major media considerably con strains their autonomy. because they are politicsdriven rather than marketdriven, Ukraine's most important media enterprises are anything but politically indepen dent. significantly, oligarchic ownership of the media enhances the risk of introducing centralized control over the media. When a media market is divided between a few owners highly dependent on politics, it is easier to get their compliance to serve a ruling political group than would be the case if media owners were more numerous and more independent. the past decade of media history in Russia and recent events in Ukraine give convincing proof of this.
the Ukrainian media market differs from media mar kets in Central and Eastern Europe in two other ways. First, the privatization of the media is still incomplete and thus there are a large number of stateowned and municipal media. second, it is in competition with the powerful presence of a neighboring (Russian) media market supported by a larger readership and a larger advertising budget. both these features distort market competition in Ukraine and reduce the sustainability of the majority of its players.
What is common to the media in Ukraine and such countries as bulgaria, serbia, Romania, or albania is that in all of them the state makes recurrent attempts to exert pressure on private media. the means of influencing the media market in Ukraine and these other countries include flawed and frequently changing media legislation and licensing policies, and, in addition, the widespread misuse of the law by the government.
an important obstacle to the development of a strong Ukrainian media market is the general disregard for the law in the country. the unhealthy situation whereby the law does not protect freedom of the press, but is used to punish of critically minded media, aggravates the condi tion of the national media market and restricts the inde pendence and pluralism of the opinions voiced in it.
Notes
